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I. The theoretical problem
C ontemporary sociology can exercise its most useful activity in economic life perhaps by contributing through its empirical findings to the overcoming of certain illusions. Illusions in 
general are not merely the suppositions of presumed relations, having 
no base. They rather stem from the fact that effective and in many 
cases firmly based indirect relations are conceived as direct ones. Thus 
they are uprooted from the complicated system of relations of 
productive activity and are made absolute. Such illusions have been 
widespread in Hungarian economic thinking especially for the past few 
years, as a natural by-product of the introduction of Economic Reform, 
the establishment of a somewhat decentralized model of the centrally 
planned economy in 1968. The measures of the Reform called 
attention to a multitude of new or formerly overshadowed relations, 
the validity and limits of which are difficult to be judged in the short 
run. Some of them have been absolutized. By means of industrial 
sociology, if properly implemented, these relations can be put in their 
due places and their indirect character can be revealed in the process 
of their confrontation with reality. O f course, along with the applica­
tion of sociology the natural risk is incurred that newly absolutized 
relations and inadequately founded generalizations will emerge, to be 
added to the already existing illusions.
In our study, refraining from the attribution of an unduly general 
validity to our observations gained through modest means, we wish 
to challenge some absolutized ideas concerning the relations between 
workers’ behaviour and material as well as non-material incentives. In 
Hungary, generally speaking nearly everyone agrees that frequent 
troubles on the shopfloor in factories— slowdowns, work of poor quality,
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high manpower turnover etc.— can be attributed to the improper 
systems of incentives. Views are, however, completely divergent as to 
the origin of the systems’ shortcomings.
(1) Business managers, engineers and economists (in conformity 
with the Theory of Scientific Management, widespread also in Hungary 
although never called by this name) seek the roots of troubles almost 
exclusively in the disfunctioning of material incentives. According to 
them workers are physiological beings, interested individually and 
without preconditions in increasing their earnings. Thus for the 
insufficiencies of shopfloor discipline, of the speed of work, the 
systems of material incentives must be blamed: material rewards 
are not closely enough related to work performance, the employees 
cannot get their extra payments, on the basis of objective rates, for 
their extra efforts. From this standpoint a general and mostly justified 
criticism is that wages in Hungarian factories are not differentiated 
enough and their distribution is not very often in line with the work 
done.
(2) Social leaders, sociologists, psychologists, however, are inclined 
to pass over material problems and believe that the major reason for 
difficulties lies in the neglect and refusal of workers’ non-material 
demands. The worker, they emphasize, is a social being, who can 
work efficiently only in a good collective, is responsive to appreciation 
from his fellow workers and managers, requests a say in the conduct 
of his own lot, and so on. This approach (which recalls that of the 
school of Human Relations) criticizes, and mostly also in a justified 
way, the lack of cohesive ‘socialist’ collectives, the autocratic style of 
the leadership of economic organizations, the exclusion of, or the 
merely formal participation of labour in company decisions.
Thus in Hungary of today the old lasting argument between 
Scientific Management and Human Relations is reproduced. T o  a 
certain extent both approaches are justified, the relations presented by 
them have been proved. According to our findings the errors of both 
material and non-material management have contributed, though in 
different degrees, to the emergence of the present-day workshop 
uneasiness, as they are of a complementary character. The two 
approaches however, presume that there is a direct relation between 
the workers’ behaviour and the factors alternately emphasized by them. 
They disregard the fact that productive activity corresponding to 
the Marxist definition is a social process, the participants of which
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respond through their actions to their overall environment in and out 
of the factory, to a complete set of economic and social factors which 
make themselves felt through complicated transmissions. The effects 
of the overall environment take shape and are realized in the dynamic 
movements of workshop and company relations of interests and powers. 
Therefore workers’ behaviour, in our assumption, always reflects a 
given state of relations of interests and powers, that of the social- 
economic environment, including also the state of certain important, 
perhaps dominating, but by no means absolute factors like material 
or non-material incentives. By describing the findings of an empirical 
study we endeavour to demonstrate the complicated mechanism 
through which all these factors influencing the workers’ actions make 
themselves felt.
The investigation has been carried out (since 1969) in a unit 
belonging to one of the best run, well organized and dynamically 
developing Hungarian engineering companies. The workshop is a 
small part of the business organization with its 400 employees of a 
total of fifteen thousand. The unit, manufacturing railway coaches, 
is subject to gradual reduction of its production. Its activity is not 
characteristic of the whole of the company: its rudimentary technology 
that has undergone only minor changes during the past twenty years, 
its noisy and gloomy workrooms are in clear-cut contrast to the 
neighbouring huge, calm and bright Diesel engine unit, implementing 
the most up-to-date achievements of modem technology.
In the aforementioned unit of the company the ‘naked’ iron bodies 
of railway coaches, the so called ‘casings’ are manufactured. Sheet 
metal workers and welders are working in three work-rooms. In the 
first of them the angle bars and metal sheets, serving as basic material, 
are cut, formed and prepared. These are assembled in the second 
work room: this is where the neatly curved frontal parts and the long 
side parts (with the empty openings of windows and doors) as well as 
the arched covers of coaches are manufactured, out of which the casings 
are assembled on the ready made chassis with the assistance of cranes. 
The last phase of the unit’s work— levelling of the sheets of casings—  
is accomplished in the third workroom. Our research has been complex: 
it comprised all the workers and supervisors in the unit. Being pressed 
by the limits of space we concentrated our attention on the activities 
of only one branch of sheet metal workers, working in the levelling 
shop of the unit.
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These sheet metal workers are a group of about sixty men, all of 
them sturdy, hard working employees, part of them under, some of 
them over thirty, but only a few above forty years of age. They make 
bumps and dents on coach sheets disappear by warming and 
hammering them flat in the workshop often called ‘concert-hall’, or 
‘conservatory’ because of its ear-splitting noise. The constant noise of 
sixty hammers is increased to an extreme of causing pain by the 
‘sound-amplifiers’ of empty iron casings. People work here with 
pieces of cotton in their ears. It is impossible to talk and to make 
oneself understood. The workers indicate by handwaves if they happen 
to need the large size hammer or the water pot. ‘Our joints, nerves, 
eyes and ears are being spoiled.’ ‘Our eye-nerves are sometimes so 
much exhausted that our sight fails us. You wipe your forehead, go 
around the shop and come back to realize that the ruler shows a 
completely different result from before.’ ‘Sometimes when I go to 
bed in the evening I ’m unable to fall asleep, because my nerves are 
all on edge. I continue to hear a chirrup.’ ‘I have been here for ten 
years and I ’m becoming hard of hearing.’— said the workers being 
always at the end of their tether. In one word: levelling of sheets 
requires enormous efforts. The job itself is judged like this: 
‘Professional knowledge is of no significance here. Only skill, instinct 
and practice are wanted. People say: there is one rule for levelling 
sheets: to beat in the bumps and to beat out the dents. But it is not 
so simple as it seems to be. One must know where to put heat in the 
metal. Every sheet is different. There are some people who learn 
it in two or three years, but others will not learn it even after some 
twenty years.’
A t the time of our field work (1969) sheet metal workers, because 
of the physical demands of their job and for other reasons to be 
analyzed later, belonged to the best paid employees of the company. 
The workgroup was paid according to a piece-rate system: the 
collective earnings of the group were dependent on ‘how many pieces 
they produced’, that is, how many coaches they levelled during a 
given period. The only privilege accorded to them, in comparison with 
skilled workers on other jobs in the unit, was the progressivity of their 
wage plan which meant increased pay after having produced a certain 
quantity of coaches. The level of group wages was primarily regulated 
by the level of piece rates. Tw o types of products were alternately 
manufactured. One of them fell under a tight piece rate and workers
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could earn by producing it only a sum enough for ‘a glass of cold 
water’. The piece rate of the other type was rather loose, whereby 
there was ‘more money in this type’. Within the group the fund of 
collective earnings was divided on the basis of personal wage rates 
of members. Individual earnings were greatly influenced by the 
quantity of overtime done, varying individually, and by periodical 
incentive bonuses of inferior importance.
II. Slow-downs followed by speed-ups— a special type of workers’ 
behaviour
The events starting from January 1968 (which we reconstructed 
from the material of unstructured interviews carried out one year 
afterwards as well as from the data in the files of the company) do 
not by themselves present an unambiguous evidence. They do not 
firmly contradict the widespread belief about the role of material 
incentives in the formation of workers’ behaviour. Nevertheless this 
belief is challenged by the events which raise delicate questions, to 
which the proper replies, if we manage to find such ones, make it 
possible to understand the motives of labour’s conduct in the workshops 
much better.
In the first quarter of 1968, that is, just after the introduction of 
the Economic Reform, company managers ‘restricted earnings’ . From 
the two types of coaches, the production of which was relatively freely 
alternated within certain natural limits, the management stressed the 
production of ‘low-paying’ type in February and March. Overtime was 
gradually reduced and no incentive bonuses were set. There was an 
overall drop in the output of the unit, covering all workshops and there 
was a corresponding drop in earnings too. The hourly wages of sheet 
metal workers diminished by one Forint in January and by two Forints 
in February and March (averaging only 10-11 Forints) in comparison 
with those of the last quarter of the previous year.
In April the situation improved: a bigger share of production was 
ensured by management from the ‘well-paying’ type of coaches. 
Workers, especially in the workshop producing components, managed 
to speed-up output and reach high earnings again. The output in the 
workshop of sheet metal workers (in the workshop occupied in levelling) 
however fell unexpectedly to a minimum of 66.7 per cent and hourly 
wages to an extremely low level of 6.80 Forints. Despite that people 
at least seemingly were working industriously with calm diligence: they
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warmed up and hammered the bumps and dents on the sheets of 
coaches, from time to time they fitted their rulers to the sheets thus 
controlling the result. Under a surface of tranquillity the nerves of 
workers were overstrained. Younger people (below the age of 30 years) 
were affected catastrophically by the anticipated extremely low level 
of earnings, since— in accordance with their low personal wage rates—  
they received a considerably smaller share of the group’s collective fund 
than their ‘older’ colleagues (those over 30 years of age). The ‘older’ 
workers, on the other hand, were scolding younger people, saying that 
they could not work. The foremen, the shop-steward and some 
professionally outstanding older workers were called upon in the 
office of the unit’s management to promote or do overtime work. They 
refused it. ‘A t an hourly wage of 6.80 Forints we should not be 
expected to work an additional two to four hours in the ear-splitting 
noise’— the workers declared. The younger workers, who had also been 
offered this possibility by the unit managers, however, undertook 
overtime. The tension between the two strata of workers was 
increasing. ‘Youngsters are more highly esteemed by managers than 
older workers. Young people are unmarried, they can do overtime. 
By doing overtime, one can conceal here the fact that he cannot 
work’— complained workers above 30. Nevertheless output did not 
increase and it seemed as if production ‘had stopped’ . The Communist 
party and trade union secretaries were trying to wheedle party members 
and union functionaries into the involvement of ‘older’ workers into 
overtime. Six outstanding workers, each with high seniority gave in 
their notices and another two requested their transfer to other units 
(there were several party members among them). Several younger 
people also left the company. While others making use of their 
constant joint and nerve complaints stayed at home on sick pay (in case 
of such slowdowns sick pay is higher than actual earnings, as it is 
paid on the basis of wages got in previous months). Thus things were 
getting worse and worse: the bottle-neck threatened the continuity 
of the entire coach production, of several units. Unit managers and 
workshop supervisors lost their head: they delayed transfers urged by 
the health conditions of workers, they telephoned to the consulting 
room pressing the doctors ‘not to let sheet metal workers go on sick 
pay, for they are only simulating complaints’. Tension in the unit 
reached its climax.
In the second half of April the management of the company found
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it advisable to intervene: it took radical incentive measures in order 
to ensure continuous coach production. Considerable sums of special 
incentive bonuses were set up with a deadline of June, later prolonged 
till September and ultimately till October. In M ay, June and July 
almost exclusively the well-paying type of coaches were produced. 
Output and earnings ran up steeply in the levelling room as well as 
in the other workshops of the unit. The ‘older’ sheet metal workers 
(working in a separate group since May because of their conflicts with 
the younger) reached a fantastic 170 per cent output index with hourly 
wages of 17.51 Forints in September. Now they were ready to do 
overtime (overtime was paid on the basis of hourly wages reached in 
the normal working hours). Overtime work became regular. Its annual 
quantity in case of a dozen ‘older’ sheet metal workers exceeded 
five hundred (!)  hours, that is, their workday under the almost 
unbearable circumstances was extended to about an average of ten 
hours. Labour turnover dropped to a minimum level after May.
A  change came in January of 1969 again. The management of the 
company started the new year, similarly to the previous one, with 
wage restrictions. On the pretext of labour’s increased practice in the 
duties of the types produced (no technological or organizational changes 
had taken place) the company carried out two piece rate cuts, on 
1st January (14.3 per cent) and on 1st April (5 per cent). Simul­
taneously overtime was reduced, and no special bonuses were set. The 
coaches under production, however, came mostly from the well-paying 
type. Piece-rate cuts were called ‘bloody’ in the unit, causing 
considerable losses in wages, except for sheet metal workers of the 
levelling shop, who reached the highest level of hourly wages in the 
previous year. The degree of the tightening of piece-rates varied in 
accordance with the output index (per cent) reached by the workgroups 
and workshops in two months that preceded the cuts. Thus the output 
indices of October and November (1968) served as a basis for the 
measures taken on the 1st of January (1969) and those of January 
and February (1969) for the cut on the 1st of April. Rejecting scientific 
methods, the management ‘threw back’ the production indices to 
108 per cent in all groups and shops mechanically by the resettings 
of piece-rates. But the output index of sheet metal workers (excluding 
the effect of progressivity) did not exceed this standard in the first 
period and it was far below 108 per cent in the second one. Conse­
quently these workers in the first quarter of 1969 avoided the scope
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of piece-rate cuts and suffered losses in their wages only because of the 
lack of overtime and special incentive bonuses.
In terms of numerical data the events of the fifteen months (from 
January 1968 to March 1969) look as the following:
T A B L E  1
Group Ratio Hourly wages
Date performance o f well Over-
1968/1969 ‘older’ ‘younger’ paying Special ‘older’ ‘younger’ time
months workers workers type in bonuses workers workers hours
prod.
%  %  %  Ft. Ft. Ft.
Jan. 109•4 80 — 11 16 3115
Feb. I05•2 39 — 11 03 1941
March 102 0 19 — 10 •11 1596
April 66 7 72 — 6 80 1654
May • 152-4 102-2 99 20700 15-61 10-43 1871
June 146-0 I I9-4 100 36800 14-94 12-16 1595
July 148-2 TI9-2 87 14-98 13-00 1842
Aug. 151-0 iro-o 73 14-50 9-87 2902
Sept. 170-6 149-7 97 23740 17-51 14-80 2211
Oct. 161-o 115-0 63 6000 16-50 11-62 1530
Nov. • 134-0 93-8 50 — 13-74 9-60 954
Dec. • 114-5 135-2 89 — n -74 13-27 450
Jan. 102-7 94-6 94 — 10-47 10-36 8
Feb. • 103-4 95-8 95 — n -57 10-57 —
March T04-6 80-3 5° — 11-71 8-59 1032
At the first glance the data of the table seem to prove the correctness 
of the conviction of the majority of Hungarian managers and 
economists that material incentives are of paramount importance: if 
workers have a chance to get extra rewards they will respond with the 
maximum performance they are physically capable of, that is, there 
is a direct relation between incentives and labour’s behaviour in 
production. Indices calculated from the data of the table above present 
the power of money with dramatic force:
Average performance 
in months with special bonuses ... 137.1%
„  „  without special bonuses ... 101.1%
„  „  with overtime above average 119.2 %
„  „  with overtime below average 98.1%
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After thorough scrutiny of the data in the table it appears, however, 
that the relation between wages and workers’ behaviour is neither 
direct, nor one-way in many cases. In other words: labour does not 
react with increased performance to the possibility of getting increased 
wages without preconditions. In April 1968 the ‘older’ sheet metal 
workers collectively considered the possibility of doing overtime and 
decided that under the given circumstances it was not profitable for 
them. Moreover instead of automatically reacting to incentives they 
initiated and pressed the management to change the course of its 
incentive policy and measures. As the shopfloor supervisors stated: 
‘the sheet metal workers made production slow down in order to extract 
more money from the company’ . And that was true. In April 1968 
the workers, though having a majority of well-paying type coaches in 
production, reduced their output to a point of endangering the 
continuity of the whole railway coach manufacturing.
The output indices for the periods of October and November 1968, 
of January and February 1969 are equally illuminating. Regarding 
other workgroups and workshops on the basis of the output indices 
of these periods severe piece-rate cuts were carried out. The perfor­
mance of sheet metal workers in these months, after some very high 
peaks, was low enough to avoid the measures taken by the company. 
The indices in January and February are especially interesting, since 
during this period the levelling shop performed at a considerably 
lower level by the production of the well-paying type than in several 
months (July, August, etc.) of the previous year, when the composition 
of products was less favourable. ‘Sheet metal workers were unwilling 
to pay the “ tax” for their uniquely high earnings’— it was said in 
the unit.
The swaying of labour’s output and earnings, as it is obvious from 
the events, was followed by changing relations, on the one hand, among 
labour, company management and unit management, on the other 
hand, among the separate strata of workers (‘older’ and younger ones 
etc.). The initial tension (February, March 1968) was followed at 
first by an acute conflict (April), then by a relative harmony and 
cooperation (from M ay to October) and by an increasing tension again 
at the end of the fifteen months period discussed in the present paper. 
Beyond these changing relations, beyond this dynamic process, in our 
assumption, there was a struggle of divergent interests, a clash between 
opposing centres of powers.
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The following question arises: what economic and social factors 
determine the contents of divergent interests, the strength of power 
centres of the participants of production within the business 
organization?
III. Labour-management and intra-labour relations of interest
The course of events in the unit at the company was basically 
determined by the conflicts between management and labour, the 
main issues being the level of wages and (what is closely related to it) 
the level of performance.
The Economic Reform made the two major participants in industrial 
production materially interested in achievements by partially con­
fronting their interests. Since 1968 a part of the companies’ profits 
has been used for differential incentive bonuses, the biggest share of 
which was paid to top managers. Labour, because of its low share 
in profits, remained to be motivated by wages. This confrontation of 
interests, resulting from the opposing nature of profits and wages, was 
strengthened in its intensity by the special conditions of the business 
organization discussed. (We would like to note that the profit sharing 
system was part of a series of national measures intended to produce 
a decentralized and more flexible industrial structure with increased 
emphasis on market requirements and efficiency.)
The management of the company, stimulated by its share in profits, 
using prices in the international market as a guide, tried to choose a 
profit-maximizing scheme in its production-possibility set. The 
decision was made to withdraw from manufacture of railway coaches 
and undertake production of heavy-duty Diesel engines for buses and 
camions. The company’s antiquated technology for railway coach 
manufacture made the operation unprofitable and state subsidies were 
being withdrawn. In addition, demand for coaches is limited and 
several other companies produce them under more favourable circum­
stances. However, since immediate cessation of production was not 
possible, withdrawal was to take the form of gradual reduction of 
production. Accordingly, management felt that cuts in production 
costs were necessary. Since investment in new equipment or processes 
was not indicated under the circumstances, management decided to 
cut labour costs by decreasing wages per unit of output. The incentive 
policy of management, the cyclical restriction of wages, was aimed at 
that. But workers, motivated primarily by wages, were naturally
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opposed to the managers’ goal and regarded it as directed at 
‘sweating’ labour.
Responsibility for the divergence of management and labour interests 
cannot be fixed, however entirely on the profit sharing system, on the 
high level of production costs, on backward technology, or on the 
withdrawal of government subsidies. A  prominent part was played in 
the continuing confrontation by the control of central agencies over 
the level of wages and by the state of labour market as well.
The central regulations pegged wages per capita on a roughly equal 
level in all engineering companies owned by the state. Any increase 
had to be covered from the share of profits to be divided among the 
participants in production, a sum that was considerable in relation to 
the salaries of managers but extremely small in relation to the total 
amount of wages of employees. Thus the management made attempts 
to cut wages per unit of output and at the same time to keep wages 
per capita unchanged; it required from its employees extra efforts 
without being willing to or, in fact, capable of giving them extra 
rewards.* Top management pressed labour for more work and stricter 
workshop discipline because of the large scale turnover and lack of 
manpower as well. As a result of the factors mentioned and of the 
liberalization of the labour market (1968) about 25 per cent of skilled 
workers and an even greater ratio of unskilled and semiskilled workers 
left the unit during the first one and a half years after the introduction 
of the Economic Reform.
Only on the basis of the conditions of the company and the specified 
central rules the management was obliged to follow, can we understand 
the contradictory features of its incentive policies. Management 
encouraged production on one hand, but when productivity and 
earnings rose appreciably, it took restrictive measures (arbitrarily reset 
piece rates, decreased overtime, etc.).
T he employees in the workshops, mostly of agricultural origin, were 
hard-working people, in whose thinking wages were fundamental in 
relation to their families’ living standards and also as a measure of
* The control of central agencies over wages was intended to avoid certain 
undesirable effects of the Economic Reform. Total freedom of managers, 
motivated by their share in profits, to regulate wages might have led to rapidly 
growing earnings for some workers, while causing unemployment for others 
and/or to a high rate of inflation and disequilibrium of supply and demand 
in the market for consumer goods. Such a process would have been followed 
by sharp and open social conflicts instead of concealed ones described in this 
paper.
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their importance in relation to others in and out of the factory. They 
were ready to make extra efforts for extra pay and aimed their activities 
at maximising earnings. Sheet metal workers told us ‘There are 
rather “ hungry” people here, if they make a lot of money they want 
even more.’— ‘We do not come here to produce railway carriages, but 
to earn a living.’— ‘Money comes first.’ Thus each worker considered 
management’s incentive policies hostile to his interests and protested 
against the efforts to cut labour costs. As workers’ devotion to money 
was general, labour-management conflicts over the level of wages were 
of the utmost gravity.
Labour, however, was divided into separate strata with various types 
of interests. Personal wage rates, seniority within the organization, 
professional skills, household expenses, structure of consumption, 
traditions and other factors produced a compartmentalization within 
them. The two major factors responsible for the division of workers 
into strata with divergent interests (and various powers) were the 
following:
1. The current level and the future prospect of the individual’s 
earnings, that is, his actual and expected economic position in the 
organization. Disregarding extra sources of income like overtime and 
special incentive bonuses, both were dependent on wages per capita 
in the workgroup to which the individual belonged and on his personal 
wage rate. As wages per capita in the long run were likely to be pegged 
by the company, differences in the actual and expected positions could 
be caused only by personal wage rates. These rates, set primarily on 
the basis of length of service in the company or job experience, moved 
rapidly upward until the age of 30 and then stopped. As a result, 
workers above 30 years of age earned a relatively good living, while 
their fellow workers below 30 years were doing rather poorly. But 
the reverse of the medal was that workers over 30 years (‘olders’) had 
no prospects of further wage increase, and management policies put 
them in a hopelessly deteriorating position, while younger workers 
enjoyed rapidly growing wages and, in this way, were partly compen­
sated for losses caused by piece-rate cuts.
2. The style of living of the worker and his family. This factor 
is closely connected with the previous one as the main source of a 
worker’s income is his earnings. People over 30 years old usually had 
a well-balanced household budget. They generally had their own 
homes, well-furnished and mechanized. They had ended debts
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connected with building or purchasing their homes, and had acquired 
durable goods such as television sets, refrigerators, washing-machines 
and motor cycles. To the earnings of the head of the family the 
earnings of the wife were added. She might also have a job as their 
children had reached school age. Workers of this strata spent money 
also on prestige consumption. For example, being villagers, they have 
iron fences constructed around their houses, to which a special prestige 
was attached by the society of the villages. Younger workers (below 
30 years), on the other hand, carried the burdens of fundamental 
investments connected with the establishment of family life. They 
were indebted to the savings bank for money to build or buy a house 
and to furnish it. Moreover, as their children were small, their wives 
could not take a job. (In the differences of the economic positions of 
families a dominant role was played by the housing shortage in the 
country, which exerted a strong pressure on young people before 
marriage and after marriage for several years.)
Thus the age of 30 seemed to be the economic (not demographic) 
dividing line. On the basis of the two major economic factors and 
some other ones, workers were divided into two major strata with 
divergent interests: those of ‘older’ people in getting money was 
intensive but flexible, those of younger workers strained and inflexible.
In addition to the two strata of workers there emerged a third one 
that was more obscure in its outlines and peripheral from the point 
of view of conflicts. This stratum consisted of unmarried young men, 
living in the household of their parents, who had for the moment no 
financial cares and reserved their energy for the evenings and the 
week-ends. It contained also elderly people who after having brought 
up their children desired to spend the few years they had until 
pension in a comfortable way. Some others in the stratum had special 
sources of income out of the factory (they did repair-work without 
licence, etc.). These people, however, represented a minority in 
the unit.
Under the influence of the contradictory features of the manage­
ment’s incentive policies workers over and below 30 set up radically 
different goals for themselves, as manifested also in the events of the 
fifteen months described. The ‘older’ sheet metal workers wanted 
to extract more money out of the company in order to ensure economic 
prospects for themselves and at the same time they strived to maintain 
the ratio between their ‘inputs’ (efforts) and ‘outputs’ (wages). T o  this
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end they were ready to make sacrifices in the short run. T o  make the 
company increase payments (in April 1968) and to avoid the jeopardy 
of piece-rate cuts (in January and February 1969) they decreased their 
output, though simultaneously they suffered from very low hourly 
wages. Considering the circumstances given they rationally optimized 
their output. ‘We work hard and very much, but one cannot become 
like a machine’— one of them said ‘I don’t like people who speed up 
without thinking and believe that they earn the big money for the 
group. They cause only troubles for the others with their greediness, 
that’s what they really do. They live from hand to mouth.’ These 
‘greedy’ people were the younger workers living under the pressure 
of great financial burdens. They also wanted to extract more money 
from the company, but they did not care a bit that the ratio of their 
inputs and outputs was constantly deteriorating, the work done was 
becoming more and more ‘unprofitable’ for them. So they limited their 
output. ‘If the company wants to cut money, it’ll do so. We work as 
long as we can. We do our best to increase output and if piece-rates 
are tightened again, we go away from the factory.’ The younger 
workers were incapable of bearing any, even momentary, losses in 
wages required by the optimization of output. For this reason the 
interests of ‘older’ and younger workers clashed in April 1968 and 
the conflict caused the division of the so far united group into two 
groups, the group of ‘olders’ and that of youngers. T o support our 
argument we show below the composition of the two groups according 
to the social-economic background of members:
T A B L E  2
Average Varia- Ratio Workers Workers
Group and of tion of of with Workers Workers having 
Number of personal personal skilled seniority o f age married their
workers wage wage workers above above own
rates rates 10 years 30 homes
Ft. Ft. %  %  %  %  %
•older’ 27 9*io 0-87 88-8 55-5 74-1 81-5 7 7 . 7
‘younger’ 27 7-58 1-27 81-5 00-0 14*8 40-7 11*0
Gap +  1-52 — +  7-3 +  55-5 +  59-3 +  40*8 +  66*7
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Lower managers, shop-floor supervisors, senior foremen and foremen 
had a specific position in the conflict of interests between company 
management and labour on the one hand, and among various strata 
of labour on the other. These ‘men in the middle’ were neglected 
(for reasons to be described later) by top management. Nothing had 
been done to ensure their cooperation with company efforts. Foremen 
received salaries inferior to those of the best-paid workers and this 
state of affairs remained unchanged regardless of their special efforts 
or negligence. Their share in profits was very small. As a result, 
management’s efforts to encourage workshop and group output, as well 
as, labour’s attempts to maximise earnings were a matter of indifference 
to shopfloor supervisors. They neither aided nor hindered their 
success, but restricted their activities to the performance of routine 
tasks. They felt hurt by their neglected position and they wanted 
peace. Senior foremen and foremen, however, bitterly opposed both 
workshop slow-downs and piece-rate cuts as the major direct trouble­
makers in the unit.
The description of the relations of interests within the unit and the 
company will no doubt bring home to us the problems on the shop-floor 
so that we can understand them better. It throws light on the back­
ground of workers’ behaviour, on the sources of tension among 
top-managers, shop-floor supervisors and various strata of labour. But 
it does not explain everything. How did the small group of ‘older’ 
sheet metal workers, 27 men, succeed in forcing its will upon the 
dissident younger people, in opposing the top managers of the powerful 
business organization with the result of getting extremely high wages? 
The answer to this was still in obscurity.
IV. Labour-management and intra-labour relations of powers
Hungarian economists, social leaders and sociologists, who accept 
the theoretical possibility of labour-management conflicts over wages 
and production within a centrally planned economy, consider relations 
of powers in the business organizations as double centred: company 
management safeguards its own interests and the trade union those 
of the workers. The former one has considerable powers, since through 
the channels of the mechanism of control (incentive systems, etc.), of 
formal rules and regulations it can influence the environment and 
consequently the behaviour of employees to a significant degree. The 
latter, the trade union, on the other hand has a legal right to participate
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in all company decisions, and even to veto certain decisions considered 
to be harmful to the interests of employees. In the unit and in the 
company in general the structure of powers was radically different 
from this desirable theoretical model and it worked through multiple 
centres instead of only two.
T o  avoid misunderstanding it must be emphasized that the Trade 
Union Committee of the company did its utmost to cope with its tasks 
under the very difficult circumstances. A  good example for that was 
given by its attitude to the two piece rate cuts in the first quarter of 
1969 (January and April).
‘Prior to accepting the January measure taken at the time of the 
reduction of weekly working hours to 45, a prolonged discussion 
developed between topmanagers and trade union leaders. Management 
was not satisfied with the degree of tightening approved by the Trade 
Union Committee and declared: piece rates would be loose even after 
the cut. Trade union leaders replied: they would not be. Top 
managers seemingly gave in by saying: All right, but should piece- 
rates turn out to be loose, that is, if output in January and February 
were to exceed 108 per cent in the unit, another cut would come. An 
agreement was reached on that. In January the cut was carried out 
and afterwards in the first two months of the year output moved 
rapidly upward. Thus management was right and according to its 
original intentions carried out a second resetting of rates on the 1st of 
April.’ Foremen gave such a report on the events in full harmony with 
the records held by the company.
During the period between the two cuts some displeasing events took 
place in the unit. ‘Management knew that the resetting of piece rates 
was a matter of little importance for some workers: they did not bother 
themselves about it, they speeded up as much as they could, because 
they needed a fixed sum of money for their household expenses and 
were determined to get it. To this end in January and February they 
jumped over necessary phases of work, violated technical prescriptions 
and pushed up their quota. It was tolerated by management in the two 
months, but afterwards piece-rates were cut again and then the control 
of quality became very strict too’— reported a technician. A  foreman 
told us: ‘After the first piece-rate cut in January our unit was given 
such an overstrained plan that the utmost had to be pressed out of the 
workers. I was fully aware of the forthcoming new tightening, but the 
majority of foremen did not envisage it.’
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What about the trade union at the company? The organization was 
unfit, by its structure and traditions, to deal with the problem 
efficiently. The union, a heritage of a previous period, united in its 
ranks all sorts of members of the business organization from unskilled 
workers to top managers. Several trade union positions were occupied 
by shop-floor supervisors and even by managers. The union’s executive 
had a share of roughly the same size in company profits as top 
management. In case of labour-management conflicts the most 
confusing question arose for the trade union: Whose interests should 
be defended against whom? In the solution of this problem trade 
unions usually chose a traditional and wrong alternative: they viewed 
conflicts as basically undesirable, accidental and glossed over them. 
As to the events in the unit in the first quarter of 1969, the top 
leaders of the union had no proper information about them at all. 
The post of the secretary of the unit trade union committee (a position 
of vital importance) was held by a foreman. A  senior foreman acted 
as president and together with several administrative employees there 
were only two or three workers in the committee. (The composition 
of the local party committee playing an important role was similar: 
all its five members came from among shop-floor supervisors.) Thus 
the Trade Union Committee of the company was obliged and in fact 
willing to accept the seemingly correct explanation of top management 
which referred to the improved job experience of workers as the cause 
of piece rate cuts. ‘Piece rates of sheet metal workers and welders 
cannot be fixed so accurately as those of machine production. These 
jobs have a knack and if someone picks it up, they are easy to do. It 
can be put down to this fact that piece rates periodically loosen up, 
output and wages go up in the unit. So piece-rate cuts are necessary 
and fully justified.’ Workers, on the other hand, told us: ‘One can 
pick up the knack of the job in a short time and that’s all. Afterwards 
labour can only be robbed by the repeated ‘trimmings’ of piece-rates.’ 
In fact, top union leaders and top company managers, despite 
occasional spectacular confrontations, seemed to be a monolithic 
group to the workers. Following the events described even those 
workers lost their faith in trade union who had any of that sort 
before. ‘A t our company the trade union functions only nominally. 
It comes to zero.’— ‘The great trouble is that trade union functionaries 
are also paid by the company.’
Despite the failure of union intervention, sheet metal workers in the
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levelling shop, as mentioned before, did not suffer from the effects of 
piece-rate cuts and there were several other groups that were little 
affected by them. The dominant push from labour came through the 
informal organization of workers, which sometimes had substantial 
powers, rival those of management. The ‘older’ group of sheet metal 
workers were described as ‘people living in unity. They are strong 
because they keep together. It does not matter how much they quarrel 
among themselves, as they always act in unity towards the outside 
world. They always know what to do and they do so.’ By help of a 
sociometric test we managed to draw up the relations of cohesion, of 
willingness for the and practice of cooperation (mutual choices) in the 
group of ‘older’ workers, that is, we succeeded in discovering their 
informal organization based on the integration of individual interests, 
representing a strong centre of powers. The group of younger workers 
had no such organization.
The group of older workers:
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The group of younger workers:
-«------- *- — mutual choice
=  =  = =  — mutual rejection
— group member. Further concentric circles mark functions in the 
work organization or social organizations (group leadership, trade 
union functions, party membership or functions etc.)
The lack of cohesion among people below 30 years of age resulted 
from a set of interacting factors. The majority of them had pressing 
need for money and on the basis of inflexible individual interests no 
lasting compromise or integration could come into existence. The 
pressure exerted by the policies of the company on them was relatively 
weak: they enjoyed rapidly growing personal wage rates, compensating 
them for losses. In addition the period they worked together in was 
rather short: they had no time to get profoundly acquainted with each 
other and their environment. The lack of cohesion prevented these 
workers from building up a stable protective informal centre of 
power.
The slogan of ‘older’ workers was that ‘principles or money can be
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defended only by collective efforts’. Their cohesion originated from the 
compromise and integration of their homogeneous and flexible 
economic interests. The nucleus of the group consisted exclusively of 
skilled workers, between 30 and 40 years of age, with well-balanced 
household budgets (all of them owned family houses or flats) and with 
maximum personal wage rates. Except for one man seniority was 
above ten years in the nucleus. Their informal bonds based on the 
principle of ‘one for all and all for one’ had considerable powers. 
When the six most popular men, the ‘collective leadership’, plunged 
themselves for some goal, they were followed by the whole of the 
group. T o  the informal means of power some formal ones were also 
added. Among nucleus members there were the group-leader, a shop- 
steward, party members and workers’ Militia men. The informal 
organization that comprised (in a composition similar to that of the 
sheet metal workers in the levelling shop) about half of the work­
groups of the unit, represented the interests of workers above the 
age of 30. The appreciation of environment and of their own 
needs by these people reached a degree at which the rational con­
sideration and evaluation of the conditions given could result in well- 
founded, coordinated and flexible joint actions aimed at the control 
of powers directed against their interests. Their informal (or to put it 
a more correct way: non-official) organization optimized workshop 
output in order to ensure the highest possible earnings for members in 
the long run, while maintaining a favourable ratio between workers’ 
efforts and profits. They got the necessary information through formal 
and informal channels and constantly and collectively evaluated them. 
Thus informal organization became an important factor of everyday 
activities at the company, capable of influencing workers’ behaviour 
and at the same time challenging the endeavours of top management.
(We would like to note that Hungarian managers and social function­
aries either refuse to believe the existence of informal organization, or 
recognize it but consider informal actions as a kind of ‘plotting’ on 
the part of workers and try to gloss over them. The group of ‘older’ 
sheet metal workers in the levelling shop paradoxically had the title 
of ‘socialist brigade’ received for its ‘outstanding efforts’ in the ‘socialist 
work competition.’)
It must be stressed that the stratum of labour united in the ranks of 
informal organization had not been selected on the basis of its inherited 
welfare and powers, but on the basis of the physical and mental abilities
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and refined intelligence of members gained in the lasting struggle in 
defence of their interests. It is not a closed grouping, since the afore­
mentioned various strata, in a sense age-groups, follow each other as 
time goes on. The young man of today, who has initially a prospect 
at the business organization and is pressed by the material needs of 
his out-of-factory environment, will soon improve his economic 
conditions but lose his prospects as well and, as a part of the 
reproduction process of generations, will join the ‘older’ workers.
The struggle of the informal organization of ‘olders’ was successful 
in maximising earnings. It was illustrated by the fact that during a 
period of one and a half years only 30 per cent of its membership 
gave notice to the company, while this amounted to 60 per cent among 
the rest of the workers. Its struggle was many-sided and started long 
before the danger of piece-rate cuts or other measures of wage 
restriction. The personnel department’s head reported: ‘Formerly 
piece rates were set on the basis of previous experience, gained in the 
process of railway carriage manufacture. Taking into account the 
piece-rates of previous types, the department of technology set reliable 
rates for new types, unless there were baroque ornaments on it. Today 
it is not like that. As soon as there comes a new type the workshop 
starts bargaining with the department of technology. Let’s take the 
example of electricians. They have very complicated tasks: they have 
to install a lot of numbered wires, those belonging to the lighting, 
heating and air-conditioning equipments. When the production of a 
new type starts, the installation is carried out from drawings, so it 
needs a lot of time. Therefore people will fight out more time than 
necessary. Piece-rates consequently will be set loose, so they ought 
to be cut down somehow. But there is no period in the year that 
could serve as an objective basis for doing so. Workers slow down 
if they get wind of the intentions of the company. And at the end of 
the year the company has to deliver products to get money from the 
bank. Then there is a rush and nobody cares whether quality meets 
the prescriptions or not. Once piece-rates seem to be very tight because 
of workers’ tactics, other times they look loose, due to the rush towards 
the end of the year.’ Thus, as a result of workers’ making use of the 
circumstances, piece-rates are set in accordance with a process of 
bargaining. It can be added that rates will be loose in workshops and 
workgroups having a strong informal organization and using tactics 
and they will become tight in shops and groups without cohesion and
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rational production-tactics.
The privileges of ‘older’ sheet metal workers resulted from tactics. 
The progressivity of their incentive plan was given in 1967, in the 
period of a slow down. Their next slow-down in 1968 (described in 
the present paper) brought them much overtime and incentive bonuses. 
The third slow-down in 1971 resulted in the loosening up of the 
piece-rates of a new type, set originally very tight by the department 
of technology. It appears that the powers of the group that rendered 
all these possible surpassed those of other informal units at the 
company. Sheet metal workers in the levelling shop were in a 
monopolistic position. They might not be pinned down: ‘Levelling of 
sheets is a type of job, in which the worker produces as much as he 
wants to. Each sheet is different, needing various amounts of time to 
be levelled.’ Workers in the shop were irreplaceable. ‘The secret of 
their successes is that such kind of sheet metal workers are hard to 
be found. If someone among the welders speaks too much or doesn’t 
undertake overtime, he is replaced.’ ‘New-comers are being cast off 
and they are not explained the knack of the job.’— the foreman 
complained, being himself also as skilled in the job ‘as the workers 
in astronomy’. (That was the reason why ‘unreliable’ younger people 
‘could not work’, as proved by the events in April 1968.) Their 
significance was further increased by the fact that the last phase of 
work in the unit was accomplished by them. ‘The world’s eyes are on 
the sheet metal workers.’— one of them claimed. ‘It is up to them 
whether the coach leaves the unit or not.’ If the group slowed down 
it threatened not only the program of the unit and the incentive 
bonuses of the unit managers and shopfloor supervisors, but sooner 
or later it caused a bottleneck in the production of units performing 
further operations as well. ‘Workers in the levelling shop are the only 
group that can make railway coach manufacture turn upside down. 
There is a backlog and workers still put down the hammer at two 
o’clock. What can I do?’— their foreman declared. Having such a 
monopolistic position one can successfully use tactics and the ‘older’ 
workers of the shop have been doing so consistently and deliberately 
for many years.
Unit managers and shopfloor supervisors had a prominent, though 
passive part in the successes of workers’ tactics. The ‘man in the 
middle’ had substantial power to influence the production and wages 
of work groups. The functional departments of management were
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incapable of controlling production problems, including supply of 
material and maintenance, and their solution was up to foremen and 
senior foremen. (This situation originated in the primitive level of 
technology.) But top managers, believing in the efficiency of centraliza­
tion within the company, did not take into consideration the influence 
of foremen and, as proved, neglected them, and did nothing to ensure 
their cooperation. In order to maintain ‘peace’ within the unit, shop- 
floor supervisors helped workers in their tactics in numerous though 
hardly traceable ways. The only reason why relations between workers 
and their supervisors deteriorated were slowdowns and other 
demonstrative actions, as in the case of the levelling shop, which 
threatened the superficial harmony.
Thus beyond the events of 1968 and 1969 there were ultimately the 
dynamic movements of labour-management and intra-labour relations 
of interests and powers. The conflicts sometimes appeared with over­
whelming intensity, sometimes they were solved by transitory 
compromises (but in all cases the happenings were disguised by the 
most suitable ideologies). The differences in the level of wages of 
the workers of the levelling shop and the rest of labour always reflected 
the outcome of this dynamic bargaining process.
V. Theoreticcd conclusions
As it has turned out from the argument above the business organiza­
tion faced serious problems, shortcomings in the field of applying both 
material and non-material incentives. Instead of summarizing these 
insufficiencies which are obvious, we intend to support our standpoint 
with two additional examples:
(1) The grave violation of the principle of wage distribution 
related to the work done is well reflected in the state of piece-rates. 
Piece-rates, as pointed out, were uniformly cut back in all workshops 
and workgroups on the basis of their output indices to 108 per cent. 
But where did the production indices reach a very high level and a 
very low level? Very high indices of output were reached in the 
months, serving as a basis for tightenings, only in shops and groups, 
where workers were capable and maximised individually their efforts 
without preconditions. Low indices of output, on the other hand, 
always reflected the fact that the relevant shops or groups either could 
not work or they were tactful and defended themselves by arbitrarily 
reducing their efforts in due time. Thus high indices, in contrast to the
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conviction of top managers, did not necessarily indicate loose piece 
rates and low indices tight ones. Thus the methods of piece-rate cuts 
employed by the company were basically wrong. Management 
rewarded helplessness and the usage of tactics and sanctioned diligence 
by them. The same level of wages in some shops and groups required 
disproportionately intensive efforts related to other units.
(2) The majority of workers (60 per cent) did not gain any sense 
of quarterly ‘production conferences’, being destined for realizing 
workers’ participation in company decisions, for functioning as a kind 
of non-material incentive for employees. Among the duties of these 
production conferences were declared ‘the inclusion of workers in the 
running of the company and its units, in working out the most 
reasonable and profitable solution of production targets’ and ‘their 
involvement in decisions related to technology, organization and 
material as well as non-material incentives’. Apart from discussing the 
most primitive problems of the organization of production process 
and apart from the formal approval of the evaluation of the ‘socialist 
competition of work’, no matters of serious concern to labour were 
discussed in such meetings. ‘Those delicate matters which are not to 
our liking, such as the problems of piece-rate cuts and the level of 
wages, are simply dismissed from the records of the production 
conferences and from the reports for the upper organs as well.’—  
complained the workers. Consequently workers tried to slip away from 
production conferences, usually held in a hurry between two shifts. 
Yet workers were far from being passive. According to the findings of 
our survey about 90 per cent of them wanted to have a say directly 
or indirectly in company decisions affecting their interests. And the 
majority of them, being perfectly informed in such matters, could 
have done so.
The shortcomings of material and non-material incentives, regarded 
as a scapegoat for shopfloor problems by Hungarian managers, social 
functionaries and sociologists, render us assistance in explaining the 
phenomenon of transitory or permanent discrepancy between labour’s 
behaviour and the goals set by the business organization. It must be 
stressed, however, that causal relations are not that unambiguous and 
simple: inadequacies in incentives, though closely connected with 
difficulties in the workshops, are not the basic cause of disciplinary 
problems and restriction of output, but primarily they themselves are 
symptoms on the surface as well.
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If we want to scrutinize troubles on the shop-floor in due depth, 
we have to analyse the relations of interests. From this approach it 
can be stated that the gap between the rules of the formal organization 
and labour’s behaviour originated from the conflicts of interests, from 
the state of labour-management and intra-labour structure of interests 
within the company. The conflict situations were permanent and latent 
and from time to time they appeared in a sharp form. Though 
harmony seemed to be possible in the short run, there was a lack of 
lasting compromise and integration of interests. Labour (the ‘older’ 
workers) demanded, among other things, economic prospects from the 
company which management could not offer. Simultaneously, manage­
ment required increased efforts and loyalty that labour was unwilling 
to give in the conditions given. Instead of a ‘good bargain’ ensuring 
reciprocal advantages for the partners, a ‘poor bargain’ was produced, 
in the terms of which the parties tried to promote their own goals by 
violating formal rules and hurting arbitrarily each others’ interests. 
Compromises were regarded by them as temporary and consequently 
the terms were unstable. As we have seen sheet metal workers were 
usually given by management concessions (special incentive bonuses, 
overtime work, etc.) that were revocable at any time. In principle a 
lasting agreement could have been concluded between the parties on 
the basis of less inhuman conditions, because sheet metal workers, as 
they put it themselves, could have done their work as intensively as 
required by the company for proper wages in normal working hours, 
without the extremely tiresome overtime or any special incentive 
bonuses. But everyday practice took an entirely different course. ‘Poor 
bargains’ determined not only the relations between management and 
labour, but those of various strata of labour, including ‘older’ and 
younger sheet metal workers as well. Young people with their 
‘greediness’ endangered the positions of ‘older’ ones, and therefore 
the latter were reluctant to give them professional advice.
The possibility of compromise or integration of interests was 
basically determined by the relations of powers. The distribution of 
means of power within the business organization was extremely dis­
proportionate. Although company management in many cases success­
fully pressed workers for more intensive work, it was hamstrung by 
central regulations, especially by the control of central agencies over 
the level of wages per capita. Managers complained that the company 
was unable to reward and sanction labour’s behaviour and had to pass
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over large scale slow downs reminiscent of strikes in their character. 
Under the pressure of central regulations the company had to reach its 
production targets by the overemployment of workers earning ‘average 
wages’ instead of the employment of necessary limited number of 
diligent and well-paid employees. Workers resisted this state of affairs 
if their non-official organization was strong, tried to break through the 
limits of average wages, though sometimes by endangering the 
continuity of production. If their informal positions were weak and 
doing the job became too ‘expensive’ for them because of the company’s 
incentive policies, they left the unit. The great demand for workpower 
in the labour market made it possible at any time. However even 
workers backed by considerable informal powers could not exert a 
continuous influence over the incentive policies of the company, because 
the Trade Union Committee of the company was unable to support 
their claims. The trade union could not take actions contradictory to 
the regulations by the central agencies, and it could not claim the 
increase of level of wages per capita pegged by the central organs. 
Consequently, the trade union could not claim a bigger say in company 
affairs than offered by the power concentrated at the level of the 
company. That is why questions connected with the level of wages 
could not be put on the agenda of production conferences, the most 
important institutions of democracy in business organizations. Never­
theless, if the problems most deeply concerning workers’ interests were 
not discussed at these meetings they became formal as a necessity.
Taking into consideration the findings of our investigation it seems 
to be worthwhile to ponder the would-be effects of the loosening or 
abolition of the system of central control over average wages per capita. 
Such an action could create at the company discussed an initial step 
of the process leading to the establishment of a workable model of 
powers, to the concentration of the necessary decision making authority 
in the business organisation. On the basis of such an amount of power 
lasting conflicts of interests, at least theoretically, could be eliminated. 
The possibility of putting conflicts to an end, however, does not mean 
the actual end of conflicts. The loosening or abolition of control over 
average wages would result in preponderant power for top managers 
and would not change the defencelessness of certain strata of labour. 
Thus this (autocratic) distribution of power would not solve the present 
problems in itself. On the contrary, it would reproduce the difficulties 
of today in a more intensified form, as the compromise of interests
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could be established only on the basis of bargaining, that is of a relative 
balance of power between the parties involved. This compromise 
cannot be replaced by any unilateral measures taken by the company 
in a position of overwhelming power. The solution ensuring green 
light for further development requires an increase of power at company 
level (more decentralization), but at the same time it does require a 
proper distribution of powers among the participants of production, 
among the various strata of labour and management as well. The 
process should be carried out in such a way that the aforementioned 
strata and groups could dispose of enough power for the defence of 
their interests. The formal organization of the trade union is destined 
for an important part in the process, as the ‘formal’ powers of manage­
ment can be counterbalanced only by those of trade union leaders 
and the disequilibrium of power among the strata of workers, resulting 
from the existence or lack of a strong informal organization, can be 
replaced by a balance only with the help of a formal organization, 
recognizing existing realities. Thus the trade union must be 
independent of the administrative apparatus of the company, and its 
structure must be submitted to profound reforms. Moreover informal 
organization, as a force in the necessary change of formal organization, 
as a protection of individual and group interests springing from the 
structured economic and social environment, must be, at least 
theoretically, recognized and practically counted on. The actual 
participation of workers should comprise not only labour in general, 
but all their groups and strata. Labour’s actual participation in decision 
making could provide a basis for the elaboration of the efficient systems 
of material and non-material incentives and could also contribute to 
the elimination of the present ‘negative’ types of behaviour on the part 
of workers.
On the basis of our experience it appears that the solution of the 
present shop-floor problems requires complex modifications in the 
present structure of micro- and macro-economic and social environ­
ment, in accordance with the ideas of the Economic Reform introduced 
in 1968. Modifications at company level (among others, the intro­
duction of new incentive systems, the elaboration of new institutions 
for workers’ participation in decisions) should be in harmony with 
corrections at upper levels. The latter, on the other hand, should 
flexibly comply with the conditions of the various business organiza­
tions: macro modifications should take into account more flexibly
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than so far the specific features of companies working under completely 
different circumstances. In such a way the relations of interests and 
powers within the organizations could be formed so that their relatively 
free play would result in a compromise and integration of particular 
interests, and negative types of behaviour of labour as well as short­
coming in incentives would disappear.
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